

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY C.F. B... DATE 8/28/89

( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY

(X) EXCISE (X) DECLASSIFY IN PART

( ) DENY ( ) EXCISE IN PART

FOI, EG or PA or other ( ) EXCISE IN PART

( ) CLASSIFY as CONFIDENTIAL OADR

( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) O, OADR

EXCISE

FI

TELEGRAM

SECRET  
CONF

AN 0780232-0429

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 141033  
ORIGIN NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05  
IO-13 OIC-02 HA-05 EG-08 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NGAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15  
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 /105 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:MHORMBLOW:DE  
APPROVED BY NEA:WRCRAWFORD  
EUR/SE:ESMITH  
NEA:PLANDE  
INR/RMA/BOA:GGRIFFIN  
NEA/RA:JMONTVILLE  
P:JFORBES

-----06J198 030259Z /70

O R 030226Z JUN 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY DACCA  
USLO PEKING  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

S E C R E T STATE 141033

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CENTO, PG0V, AF, PK, UR

SUBJECT: CENTO COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES MEETING, JUNE 5, 1978

SECRET  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 141033

REF: ANKARA 4060 (MOTAL) NR

CONFIDENTIAL



DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

1. WE HAVE ASKED KABUL TO INCLUDE YOU AS AN ADDRESSEE ON THEIR SUBSTANTIVE REPORTING CABLES AND HAVE REPEATED SEVERAL OF THEIR PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS TO YOU. (X)

[REDACTED]

(X) 2. [REDACTED]

-- WE RECOGNIZE AFGHANISTAN, WITH OR WITHOUT SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT, COULD REVIVE PUSHTUNISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN QUESTIONS THEREBY CAUSING SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS FOR IRAN AND PAKISTAN.

-- THE U.S. IS CONCERNED BY HOW NEW SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN COULD AFFECT REGION. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING AFGHAN SITUATION WITH PRIME MINISTER DESAI IN WASHINGTON JUNE 13-14, AND SECRETARY SAW PAK FOREIGN MINISTER SHAHI ON JUNE 2 AND DISCUSSED SITUATION WITH HIM.

-- WE STILL HAVE NO PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN PLANNING OR EXECUTION OF COUP. SOVIETS THOUGH HAVE MOVED QUICKLY TO CAPITALIZE ON NEW SITUATION. DURING PAST SEVERAL WEEKS AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET UNION HAVE SIGNED AT LEAST 9 ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS TOTALING \$30-40 MILLION. ALL THESE AGREEMENTS WERE UNDER NEGOTIATION WITH THE DAQUD GOVERNMENT. IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS THERE HAVE  
SECRET  
SECRET

PAGE 03

STATE 141033

ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF CARGO FLIGHTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO KABUL AND THEY HAVE SENT ADDITIONAL MILITARY ADVISORS. WE NOW BELIEVE THERE ARE AROUND 600 SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ABOUT 1,000 ECONOMIC ADVISORS.

-- IN TERMS OF SOVIET POLICY WE BELIEVE THAT ALL THEIR ACTIONS WERE BE TAKEN WITH ONE EYE TO INDIA AS THEY WON'T WISH TO DO ANYTHING WHICH WILL UNDOLY ALARM THE INDIANS. SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZE THAT NEW GOVERNMENT IS FRAGILE AND ARE LIKELY TO ADVISE RESTRAINT WITH REGARD TO EXTERNAL ADVENTURISM FOR THE TIME BEING. THEY WILL PROBABLY BE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BEARING IN MIND, HOWEVER, THE LIMITED AFGHAN ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY.

-- WE BELIEVE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT'S MAIN GOAL NOW IS TO STAY IN POWER. MAIN THREATS TO NEW REGIME COULD COME FROM TRIBES AND SUCH GROUPS AS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED REPORTS OF SCATTERED RESISTANCE IN PARTS OF KUNAR, MANGARHAR AND PAKTIA PROVINCES. WE WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT MANY MILITARY OFFICERS FROM 7TH AND 8TH INFANTRY BRIGADES WHO DID NOT SURRENDER HAVE TAKEN OFF FOR THE HILLS. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT MANY FORMER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS HAVE GONE INTO TRIBAL AREAS OR INTO HIDING. MOREOVER, REUTER REPORTED JUNE 1 THAT EIGHT RIGHT WING AFGHAN

PARTIES HAD JOINED TOGETHER TO FORM NEW PARTY CALLED THE JUBBNAT-E-MILLI (NATIONAL REFUGEE FRONT) IN ORDER TO "STRUGGLE FOR THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM IN AFGHAN-ISTAN." HOWEVER IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER TRIBAL GROUPS COULD MOUNT EFFECTIVE OFFENSE AGAINST CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

-- NEW REGIME COULD ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES UNLESS IT CAN DELIVER ON ITS PROMISES. IN THIS CONNECTION LAND REFORM MAY BE A KEY TEST. ON THE OTHER HAND AN OVER-HASTY OR ILL-PLANNED EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT  
SECRET  
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 141033

PROMISES TOO QUICKLY MIGHT BACKFIRE.

-- THE USG IS STILL TAKING THE NEW REGIME'S PRONOUNCEMENTS ON NON-ALIGNMENT AT FACE VALUE AND MAKING IT CLEAR NOTICE THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO LIVE UP TO THIS STATED POLICY. WE HOPE TO CONTINUE OUR ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAVE AUTHORIZED OUR AMBASSADOR IN KABUL TO CONDUCT EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS WITH APPROPRIATE CABINET MINISTERS CONCERNING CONTINUED U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. WE ARE TAKING THIS STEP BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT TO BE IN BEST INTERESTS TO US AND CENTO COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE TO TOTAL RELIANCE ON THE SOVIET UNION AND TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENCOURAGE AN INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN.

-- THE AFGHAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE LOOKED AT IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT. COOPERATION AMONG COUNTRIES OF THE REGION

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER.

3. LONDON, TEHRAN, PARIS, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, Dacca, CAIRO,  
PEKING MAY DRAW UPON PARA 2 ABOVE IN ANY DISCUSSIONS YOU  
HAVE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN WITH MPA. CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED